December
21, 2005
Can the Democrats “Nationalize” 2006?
By Jay Cost
That DCCC Chair Rahm Emanuel refused to predict for The Hill
last week that the Democrats would recapture the House is very
telling. “We’re not in a game of predictions,”
Emanuel said. This is, of course, quite true. But he is in a game
of winning elections, which first requires recruiting good candidates.
And good candidates who wish to serve on the Hill read The
Hill. Why would Emanuel refuse an opportunity to fire up
the elite part of his base, possibly inducing the marginal top-tier
Democratic fence sitter to toss his hat into the ring, by publicly
stating his confidence in victory? It is reasonable to guess that
it is because both Emanuel and the elite Democrats he is trying
to convince are increasingly certain that a Democratic takeover
of the House is out of the question. Said Emanuel, “My job
is to affect, not predict.” Fair enough. But, if he thought
the Democrats could retake the House, would he not proclaim it?
In that situation, is not predicting the same as affecting?
In recent
days, I have noticed a shift in talk about changes in the congressional
balance of power, much like Emanuel’s subtle defeatism.
Democrats, at least those who are coming around to this opinion,
must be incensed about the newly discovered impossibility of retaking
Congress. After all, Bush’s numbers are low across the board.
Congress’s numbers are worse. This president led the nation
into a war in which, as of today, a majority does not want to
be involved. What is more, the public is just downright concerned,
even agitated, about the general state of American affairs. Why
can the Democrats not capitalize on this seemingly momentous opportunity?
This is
a question that I find very intriguing – for it moves beyond
the soap opera of our day-to-day politics and toward the very
design of our governmental and electoral institutions. It is they,
so often and so easily overlooked by our pundit class, that are
thwarting Democratic designs. Why? This column represents the
last in a series offering a reasonable answer. The first column,
broadly speaking, dealt with the extent to which the American
political landscape offers a real opportunity for the Democrats
to retake Congress (answer: a small extent). The second dealt
with the extent to which today’s polls indicate that the
public is ready to switch parties (answer: a small extent). This
column will deal with the extent to which Democrats have a realistic
strategic possibility for retaking Congress. To appreciate what
I mean by this, imagine that the most brilliant political tactician
is currently working for the Democrats. And, please, do not imagine
Bill Clinton – he is very overrated, unless you think that
a politician who lost his party both Houses of Congress, never
won half of the electorate, never had any coattails worth mentioning,
could not secure the presidency for his successor, gave his opponents
virtually every policy change they demanded in his second term
and managed to get himself impeached (by the same opposition,
at that!) is a brilliant tactician. There is a difference between
a bewitching personality and a sophisticated tactical mind.
The question
I shall answer is whether such a modern day Machiavelli could
win the Democrats control of Congress. Is there a strategy that,
if executed by way of tactical perfection, could result in Democratic
triumph? Emanuel, who is undoubtedly one of the smartest politicians
in Congress, indicated to The Hill exactly how the Democrats
might retake the House.
That is through
“nationalization” – i.e. the process of transforming
local elections into a kind of referendum on the state of the
nation. Emanuel is probably correct that nationalization is the
only way to take back the House and the Senate. In years past,
swings of 16 seats have occurred in congressional elections that
were decidedly local. However, over the years what is known as
the incumbency advantage (i.e. the electoral advantage that incumbents
enjoy because of higher name recognition, the congressional franking
privilege, greater access to funds, ability to draw district lines,
etc.) has become more advantageous, making swings of 16 seats
less likely. In the last twenty years there has only been one
swing of that magnitude – 1994. Democrats today often blame
GOP-tilted redistricting for the increased incumbency advantage,
but (a) there are many other factors that have enhanced it (most
notably the rise in campaign costs, which have made it more difficult
to mount an effective challenge), (b) Democrats do the same when
presented with the opportunity, (c) studies have shown that bipartisan
compromises on redistricting tend to heavily favor incumbents
(and therefore Republicans over Democrats, as there are more incumbent
Republicans), sometimes more than partisan plans, and (d) studies
have not yet convincingly shown that redistricting diminishes
“representativeness”. Usually, the only way around
the incumbency advantage (absent a nationalized election) is to
win the seats of retiring members, i.e. open seats. But, the rate
of retirement has declined over the years and, accordingly, there
are very few congressional retirees this year. The rise of the
incumbency advantage and the decline of retirees are such that
nationalization is necessary for the Democrats to recapture the
House.
But nationalization
is easy, right? The Republicans themselves showed the Democrats
how to do that. All the latter need do is develop their own version
of the Contract with America – a set of policy prescriptions
designed to take advantage of the public’s anti-Washington,
anti-Republican, anti-Bush mood. Well, not quite. An analysis
of post-election public opinion polls from 1994 shows that one
should not be hasty in giving the Contract much credit. Specifically,
the data creates some puzzles that make it difficult to pin down
exactly how it was effective. Typically, it is candidates in open
races who use to great effect issue positions like those embodied
in the Contract. Thus, we would expect in 1994 that Republican
candidates in open seat races, not challengers of incumbents,
would have been the greatest beneficiaries of the Contract. But,
in fact, it was exactly the opposite. The data indicates that
it was challengers who benefited most from the Contract. What
is more, a week before election day, a New York Times/CBS
News poll found that a whopping 71% had never heard of the Contract
with America. The poll further found that only 7% claimed that
it would make them more likely to vote Republican (and 5% said
it would make them less likely to vote Republican). So, clearly,
the Contract with America was not sufficient to bring about the
GOP victory that year.
It is better
to say that the Contract was part of an overall push by the Republicans
that year to change the public’s frame of reference. It
is best to say that the Contract was a symbolic representation
of the key ingredient that year – Republican unity. In other
words, the Contract did not induce the public to vote differently
than it did in 1992. Rather, it reflects the Republican approach
to the election: unify the party in opposition to what the public
identified as the gridlock and misdirection of Clinton’s
Democratic Party. The Contract represented Republican unity.
Unity, however,
is not sufficient for electoral victory – not in 1994 and
not in 2006. If all 450 or so Democratic candidates met on the
steps of the Capitol to announce that they are unified, we would
not expect that alone to sweep the GOP out of power. In politics,
unity is not intrinsically valuable. It is, rather, a means to
an end. In 1994 GOP unity enabled the party to shift the focus
of the electorate ever so slightly. In other words, studies have
shown that the Republicans did not nationalize 1994 by making
the election a referendum on which party the public wanted to
control of Congress, and certainly not on whether the public liked
or disliked the Contract. What the Republicans did, rather, was
connect individual Democrat members of Congress to Clinton. A
unified GOP made this a message that was consistent across elections
and heard by many more voters than who would have heard it had
a few local candidates said the same. Think of it this way. It
is one thing if WPXI’s David Johnson, by repeating Rick
Santorum’s campaign message, suggests to his nightly news
viewers that Harris Wofford has voted against Pittsburgh’s
values. It is another thing if Tom Brokaw, in the next half hour,
by repeating Newt Gingrich’s campaign message, suggests
the same about Democrats generally. In 1994, the message was,
“Your congressman voted against your values!” and
unity was the megaphone for this message.
Thus, the
second part of the GOP’s success that year was attaching
members of Congress to Clinton. They did this by using the roll
call votes of individual Democratic members of Congress to connect
them to particularly unpopular elements of the Clinton agenda.
Most notably, the GOP managed to connect Southern, Midwestern
and Western Democrats to Clinton’s 1993 budget bill and
the assault weapons ban. This is why the GOP was relatively unsuccessful
in the North – Northern voters largely supported the major
parts of Clinton’s legislative successes. Thus, Northern
Democrats made it through the 1994 midterms mostly unscathed.
But Democrats in more conservative regions, at least Democrats
in those regions who voted against their districts for the sake
of their party, were much more likely to lose.
This is how
1994 was a national election. Precisely speaking, local politics
was not so much nationalized in 1994 as national politics was
localized. If, therefore, the Democrats hope to nationalize 2006
in the same way that 1994 was a national election, they must first
unify and they must second attach individual members of Congress
to President Bush. Can they do this?
Let’s
examine the possibility of Democratic unity first. It seems very
likely that the Democrats can indeed unify on a series of domestic
policy proposals that would be, by and large, palatable to the
American electorate (though whether such measures would be compelling
is another matter entirely, one that we will not address here).
Bush has had, after all, lots of trouble connecting with the American
public on domestic issues. But the real sticking point for Democratic
unity is obviously Iraq. Democratic unity would have to include
a coherent and relatively specific position on Iraq upon which
most-to-all Democrats agree. Indeed, unity on domestic issues
would probably seem hollow and meaningless without unity on Iraq.
It is very
clear that, as of right now, the Democrats are not unified on
Iraq – neither in terms of specifics nor even in terms of
the broad-brush strokes. Some Democrats want the US out of Iraq
immediately, some want a structured but purposeful drawdown, some
want the status quo, and some want us to amp up our involvement.
This covers the complete spectrum of opinions on Iraq, which means
that the Democrats are about as variable as they possibly can
be. What is more, it surely is something when the House Minority
Leader and the former vice presidential nominee are on opposite
sides of the issue. Is it possible for the Democrats to overcome
these policy differences for the sake of unity?
The answer
seems to be no. The Democrats face a classic “collective
action dilemma”. This is the type of situation that occurs
whenever people pursue a collective goal (i.e. a goal that everybody
can enjoy regardless of whether they actually contributed to its
achievement). The Democrats’ collective goal is control
of Congress. If they achieve it, all Democratic members of Congress
will be able to enjoy it, regardless of whether they helped achieve
it. If unity on the Iraq issue is part of the way to achieve that
goal, Democratic members of Congress will have to find some significant
common ground. But the divergence of opinion among members of
Congress reflects the divergence of opinion among different constituencies.
It is no coincidence that Ted Kennedy and Ben Nelson have different
views on Iraq – the former being more liberal than the latter:
Massachusetts is more liberal than Nebraska. Thus, if the Democrats
are to find some common ground, some set of Democrats must shift
their positions on Iraq such that they are less representative
of their constituencies. In other words, they must pay some kind
of cost – in this case an increased chance of defeat.
However,
as we said above, they are pursuing a collective end: if the goal
is achieved, all congressional Democrats will be able to enjoy
it regardless of whether they were loyal. In situations like this
– which are called “prisoners’ dilemmas”
– the choice we expect all rational individuals (i.e. those
who are interested in getting the best possible outcome for themselves)
to make is to not help achieve the goal, i.e. “defect”.
All players in a prisoners’ dilemma are best off if they
defect and others participate, and worst off if they participate
and others defect. Thus, the best strategy is to always defect.
Because the Democrats face a prisoners’ dilemma wherein
they can each choose to pay for the collective good and wherein
payment for does not affect future enjoyment of the good, we can
expect the Democrats who are asked to pay a cost to refuse. Such
Democrats will be better off by being disloyal, regardless of
what their fellow Democrats do.
There are,
of course, ways around the problem of collective action. One such
way is a central authority that rewards people for participating
and punishes them for refusing to participate. But there is no
such authority in American political parties, which are very decentralized
compared to their European counterparts. If the Democratic Party
decides to coalesce around a leftist agenda on Iraq, and Ben Nelson
refuses to participate, there is nobody in a position to punish
him for his disloyalty. From Ben Nelson’s perspective, he
is better off being disloyal than being loyal – what good
is it to him if the Democrats recapture the Senate, but he loses
his seat? The same logic holds for left-of-center Democratic members
of Congress (Maria Cantwell and Debbie Stabenow come to mind)
if the party decides to move rightward. It also holds for challengers
of Republicans. It does the individual no personal good to sacrifice
him- or herself for the sake of the common good of the party.
There is
an intractability to the problem of collective action. Once you
face it, you cannot solve it. The only real alternative is to
avoid it by somehow changing the incentives of the individuals
involved, but the Democratic leadership lacks the ability to do
that. Thus, it should come as no surprise that recent reports
about Democratic tactics suggest that, at best, the party is going
to take an open-ended, and therefore ambiguous, approach to what
constitutes “Democratic opinion” on Iraq. As The Washington
Post reported last week, the unified Democratic position,
when it emerges, will be extremely broad – so broad that
it can, according to Jim VandeHei and Shalaigh Murray, “provide
the party enough maneuvering room to allow Democrats to adjust
their position as conditions in Iraq change”. This shall
give both conservative and liberal Democrats sufficient cover.
The problem with this, obviously, is that it is nowhere near close
to the kind of specificity that the Democrats need to nationalize
the election. And, on Friday, Nancy Pelosi said that the final
Democratic position will be the null set – that the party
will take no unified stand whatsoever about what to do next in
Iraq. In other words, the leaders are not even going to ask their
rank-and-file to pay personal costs for the sake of party unity.
This is exactly the sort of result we expect in a prisoners’
dilemma. Substantive unification is not in the cards, and so the
party’s leadership – because it cannot coerce members
into a unified position – is essentially throwing its hands
up.
Pelosi’s
spin on the disunity, that it was a sign of strength, was a particularly
amusing attempt to save face (likely with potential Democratic
donors). Disunity is a sign of strength – that is just like
how it is much easier to break 100 sticks all at once than it
is to break them individually, right? She must be referring to
that weak kind of strength that we hear so much about. This is
not going to help the Democrats do what they want to do. It seems
that the their will boil down to, “We Democrats oppose President
Bush, but we offer you, the public, no specific alternative upon
which we agree”. This position, which is the kind of result
to expect in a collective action dilemma, is essentially what
every opposition party does every election year. Every opposition
party can minimally agree on being in opposition – such
a position, however, is not sufficient for the Democrats to acquire
the reins of government next year.
Unification
thus seems impossible; can the Democrats at least attach Republicans
to unpopular measures? Is there such a set of roll call votes
that the Democrats can use? There does not seem to be such a set
– at least a set that does not result in the same kind of
collective action dilemma for the Democrats. Attempting to tie
the GOP to, for instance, the Iraq vote in 2002 or the Schiavo
vote earlier in the year (the two most promising candidates, it
seems) will implicate many Democrats, who invariably will shirk
from participating in such a strategy. What will induce them to
stick their necks on the line, risking their seats and their careers,
so that the Democrats can retake Congress?
If any party
will have roll-call ammunition next year, it will probably be
the Republicans. House Republicans have put the Democrats on record
as opposing a bastardized version of the Murtha proposal, thus
opening the way to more charges of “flip-flopping”
when campaign rhetoric gets too close to what the GOP characterizes
as the intent of the proposal on which the House voted. What is
more, as Dan Balz reported last week in The Washington Post,
the Republicans are planning to again put the Democrats on the
record, this time in terms of “artificial” timetables
about Iraq.
The Democrats
have no such opportunities because they do not control Congress,
and importantly, because the Bush White House is far too perceptive
to have opened itself to this kind of attack. Clinton, in his
first two years of office, consistently advocated proposals that
much of his congressional party’s electoral constituency
found unpalatable. What is more, Clinton induced members of Congress
from those conservative constituencies to put themselves on the
record as supporting his proposals. He made his members of Congress
vote to the left of their constituents, opening them up to attacks
from the right. Bush has tenaciously avoided this kind of blunder.
Rarely (if ever – no significant bill comes to my mind)
has he forced congressional Republicans to vote to the right of
their constituencies. He has forced them to vote to the left,
for sure, but this does not make them vulnerable to general election
attacks. Clinton, by pushing for measures that alienated upper
middle class suburban voters and Southern, Mid- and Western voters
in his first two years, put many Democratic members of Congress
in harm’s way. That is why so many Democrats went the way
of Marjorie Margolies-Mezvinsky (a name you read nowadays only
in columns like this or on Trivial Pursuit cards).
Unfortunately
for the Democrats, it is unlikely that a broader strategy of guilt
by association will be effective. Without roll call votes, it
is just too hard to associate a member of Congress with what people
today do not like about Washington. For instance, consider Democrat’s
plan to label the GOP the party of congressional corruption. This
is all well and good as a way to set a general tenor for next
year’s elections or to satisfy the donating base’s
appetite for rhetorical red meat. And, if there were to be many
open seats next year, it might be sufficient to tilt the House
toward the Democrats. However, there are fewer than usual open
seats. This means that the culture of corruption theme, to be
effective, must be attached to individual incumbent Republicans.
And, unless the Democrats will be satisfied unseating Ney and
Delay, or unless we discover literally dozens of (net) Republicans
who have been scandalous, such a strategy will not result in Democratic
control of Congress. At the end of the day, individual members
of Congress are very effective at running away from public antagonism
to their party or Congress as a whole. It is unlikely, for instance,
that Christopher Shays is going to lose his seat because Ronnie
Earle has indicted Tom Delay.
Thus, a recapture
of the House or Senate is out of the Democrats’ grasp,.
It is not a matter of the Democrats discovering the right tactics
to use. It is a matter of strategic possibility, or rather strategic
impossibility. Christopher Columbus failed to discover a water
route to the Indies not because he was a bad sailor but because
America stood in his way. So it is for the Democrats in 2006.
There is just no way for them to recapture Congress in this environment.
The nature of congressional elections and the internal divisions
within the Democratic Party preclude the possibility of a Democratic
recapture of either chamber of Congress.
Jay
Cost, creator of The Horse
Race Blog, is a graduate student of political science at the
University of Chicago. He can be reached at jay_cost@hotmail.com.
