November 23, 2005
Putting Balance in U.S.-China Mil-Mil
By Peter
Brookes
Scuttlebutt has it that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and
his new top Pacific brass, Adm. William Fallon, have been going
at it hammer-and-tong over the depth and breadth of our relationship
with China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA).
No element
of the Sino-U.S. relationship is more fraught with complexity,
danger and disagreement than defense issues. And while private
disagreement/debate among senior officials can help flesh out
good policy, there's no room for wishful thinking about Beijing's
Pacific intentions and ambitions.
Adm. Fallon,
the four-star Commander in Chief of the U.S. forces in the Pacific
(CINCPAC), seems to think that "engaging" the PLA, including
military-military meetings and visits/exchanges, will boost stability
and enhance American security and other interests in Asia.
A Sino-U.S.
"mil-mil" engagement program might include military
academy/war college exchanges, senior officer/civilian expert
meetings in Hawaii and Washington — and even joint U.S.-Chinese
exercises such as peacekeeping or search and rescue missions.
CINCPAC seems
to believe that failing to regularly communicate with his Chinese
counterparts through "military diplomacy" is risky business,
which could lead to miscalculation or misunderstanding —
increasing the chance for conflict between his forces and the
PLA.
Advocates
of engagement say it can also help us gain insights into PLA capabilities,
defense concepts and personalities; deter the use of force against
Taiwan or other U.S. allies; and reduce the proliferation of weapons
from China to North Korea, Iran and Pakistan.
Rumsfeld
is much more skeptical of Chinese short- and long-term plans.
(That he recently made his first trip to China in nearly
five years as defense secretary should tell you something).
Think back
to April 2001: Rummy had barely set up shop in the Pentagon when
a Chinese fighter nearly splashed a Navy EP-3 plane over the South
China Sea. The Chinese plundered the highly-classified aircraft
for intelligence and held the crew for 11 days.
Insiders
say the secretary sees the existing Sino-U.S. "mil-mil"
relationship as overly advantageous to the Chinese — and
chock full of risk of exposing U.S. strategic intentions, sensitive
doctrine and cutting-edge capabilities to the PLA with little
benefit to America.
One issue
is China's lack of reciprocity. For example, while PLA delegations
visit the Pentagon, China has yet to come through on standing
U.S. requests for return trips to the PLA's equivalent HQ.
In addition,
there is very little Chinese defense transparency. The secretive
and deceptive PLA is very reluctant to let the Americans get a
good look at Chinese military forces, doctrine and capabilities.
Even simple
access is a problem. While our side gives PLA visitors exposure
to real, active-duty U.S. troops and forces, Americans get trotted
out to Chinese "show units" and meet with "barbarian
handlers" (i.e., the PLA's political commissars and intel
officers).
China keenly
feels the U.S. technological edge in intel collection, and so
uses exchanges with U.S. counterparts to gather information on
American military practices and equipment, especially on high-value
target vulnerabilities (e.g., aircraft carriers).
Back in the
'90s, Congress decided that the Clinton Pentagon had grown too
open in its handling of the "mil-mil" relations with
China. To counter what it saw as PLA exploitation of U.S. naivete,
it passed a law in 2000 cracking down. This prohibits "inappropriate
exposure" to the PLA of certain U.S. military capabilities,
including force projection, nuclear weapons, combined/joint operations,
logistics and space operations.
The U.S.-China
mil-mil relationship is a double-edged sword. Yes, there's reason
to be skeptical — and cautious — about Chinese snooping,
being sucked into an active disinformation campaign or lulled
into complacency about China's rise.
Yet it promises
real advantages for the American side, too. We can gather info,
assess perceptions, understand the fitness and mettle of Chinese
commanders and make our own intentions more clear — if,
and only if, we get the access, reciprocity and transparency from
the Chinese side.
Basically,
we can't just rely on faith in the potential benefits. The defense
relationship must advance/protect American security interests
in the Pacific.
No one is
looking to cross swords with the Chinese, but it might happen.
Any mil-mil program with China must make us well-informed, clear-eyed
and sober about the PLA.
Peter
Brookes is a Heritage
Foundation senior fellow. This article originally appeared
in The New York Post.
©
1995 - 2005 The Heritage Foundation
Visit the Heritage Foundation at http://www.heritage.org/
