October
5, 2005
Fear Not Selling as Easily for Al-Qaida
By Austin
Bay
On Oct.
12, 2002, terror bombers murdered 202 people on the Indonesian
island of Bali. The terrorists belonged to Jemaah Islamiya (JI),
Al-Qaida's nom de guerre in Southeast Asia. Eighty-eight Australians
died in that attack.
Two months
later, in Singapore, I interviewed an American law enforcement
official who had been advising Southeast Asian nations on security
operations and investigation techniques.
"Bali's
a Hindu island with Australian tourists," the officer told me.
"Australia is an active U.S. ally (in the War on Terror). That
blast was an economic shot at Indonesia. New York Times
Sunday travel section readers know where Bali is."
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He also
added: "The religious dimension (Hindu Bali in Muslim Indonesia)
is there, and the tourists, but JI wants to shake up Indonesia.
Test its response."
He meant
that strategically the October 2002 attack would test Indonesia
and other Southeast Asian nations' ability to respond in terms
of judicial and governmental action, as well as police security
measures.
This Oct.
1, suicide terrorists struck Bali, leaving 26 dead. No one missed
the attack's economic dimension -- Bali's tourist industry had
begun to recover from the 2002 massacre.
Stopping
a self-immolating fanatic as he walks from the beach into a restaurant
is a tough challenge, particularly on a resort island with a laissez-faire
ambience. Suicide bombers still penetrate Israel, which arguably
possesses the planet's best counter-terror police policy. Nevertheless,
the attack embarrassed Indonesian officials who claim security
on Bali has improved since 2002. After the attack, hotels emptied,
as tourists returned home.
Based on
the public outrage in Indonesia, however, in Southeast Asia and
internationally, JI's latest murder binge is anything but a victory
for jihadist terror. These reactions suggest that, since 2002,
"something has changed" -- and the change has not been in Al-Qaida's
strategic favor.
For one
thing, the death toll is far smaller. The Indonesian government
has also attempted to co-opt JI. Jakarta convicted JI's "spiritual
leader," Abu Bakar Bashir, for conspiracy in the 2002 bombings,
but has since treated him with deference. This has led to a diplomatic
contretemps with Australia. However, the jailed Bashir said he
disagreed with the latest attack, since it "sacrificed innocent
people."
But something
larger seems to be at work. One indication is the overall tone
of news coverage and public reaction -- call it anger with a shrug.
While terrorist apologist and British MP George Galloway may yet
sally forth with "root causes" rhetoric and anti-American agitprop,
at the moment, the latest Bali blast has not produced demands
that the world "understand what the terrorists want." Everyone
knows the jihadists want to sow fear.
Fear, however,
doesn't seem to sell as easily as it did.
In retrospect,
the Madrid strike in March 2004 may prove to be the high point
of terror's fear offensive. Spain left the Iraq coalition. Since
then, the jihadists have had many headlines, but no victories.
London's
bulldog response to attacks in July 2005 was a distinct rejection
of fear, but it is one of many. Arguably, Afghanistan began the
trend with its successful October 2004 presidential election,
conducted despite Al-Qaida's sworn vow to stop it. Arab media
have noticed the Iraqi people's grit and guts. The Iraqis have
not buckled despite "Al-Qaida in Mesopotamia's" daily massacres.
These are massacres in a Muslim land launched by jihadist extremists
-- a point that no one misses.
Al-Qaida
also is dogged by an extraordinary "policy failure." In the wake
of 9-11, Al-Qaida proclaimed a new "global caliphate." Jemaah
Islamiya's sole policy goal remains the creation of a grand "Islamic
state" stretching from southern Thailand through Malaysia, and
the Philippine and Indonesian archipelagoes.
Three years
after Bali, four years after 9-11, the jihadists "God-ordained
empire" hasn't materialized.
We might
also consider the possibility of "media saturation." Terrorists
don't simply target Bali and Baghdad, they target the news media.
A bomb produces searing, gripping TV footage. But over time, sensational
violence becomes, well, less sensational. The latest attack on
Bali is being treated as a heinous echo of 2002, not the harbinger
of jihadist revolution. When Al-Qaida's explosions lose their
media sizzle, Al-Qaida will have lost completely.
Copyright
2005 Creators Syndicate
