October 15, 2005
What to Do About Russia By James
M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul
In his first
term in office, President George W. Bush established and nurtured
a close personal relationship with Russian President Vladimir V.
Putin. Early on, Bush’s overtures toward his counterpart in
the Kremlin produced beneficial results for the president’s
policies. President Bush succeeded in persuading Putin to acquiesce
in the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a revision
of the Cold War arms-control regime that Bush deemed necessary for
his security agenda. After the attacks of September 11, Putin sided
publicly and unequivocally with the United States in the war on
terror, providing material and intelligence assistance to the American
military intervention in Afghanistan and not hindering the deployment
of American troops in Central Asia. Since then, Russian and American
officials claim that the two countries have continued to share intelligence
in fighting cooperatively the global war on terror.
During each
man’s second term, however, the Russian-American bilateral
relationship exhibits little of the optimism and enthusiasm expressed
immediately after September 11 in both countries about common
struggles, new alliances, or shared values. At their recent meetings,
both Bush and Putin have made sure to continue to praise each
other personally, but behind the rhetoric of friendship is a troubled
partnership in drift. In advancing Bush’s three central
foreign policy objectives — fighting the war on terror,
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
promoting liberty — Russia makes no significant contributions.
In addition, the drift toward autocracy inside Russia has helped
to produce a Russian foreign policy more at odds with Western
interests and values in places like Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova.
Rhetorically and symbolically, Putin and his aides seem determined
to rekindle Cold War antagonisms, denouncing “Western”
backing for terrorists after the tragedy in Beslan and American
“meddling” in fomenting revolution in Ukraine while
at the same time conducting joint military maneuvers with China.
President
Bush’s foreign policy priorities today do not include Russia.
He and his foreign policy team are focused first and foremost
on stabilizing Iraq, fighting terrorism, managing China’s
growing power, dealing with Iran and North Korea, and perhaps
repairing relations with Europe, a long list which leaves little
time for Russia. A major review of his Russia policy is not likely
to be high on Bush’s agenda. At the same time, the president
can no longer pretend that his personal ties with Putin are a
substitute for an effective American policy for dealing with Russia
and especially Russia’s autocratic drift. In the long run,
Bush’s failure to develop a new and more strategic policy
toward Russia could create serious problems for American national
security interests — i.e., a nationalist leader in the Kremlin
with anti-Western foreign policy interests empowered by a thriving
economy, a state-owned oil and gas conglomerate with tentacles
deep into Europe, and a revamped Russian state and military with
imperial ambitions. Fortunately, the probability of this outcome
is still small; now is the time to ensure that it remains so.
The most
effective strategy for Bush’s new foreign policy team to
help slow Russia’s democratic deterioration is not isolation,
containment, or confrontation, but rather deeper engagement with
both the Russian government and Russian society. The United States
does not have enough leverage over Russia to influence internal
change through coercive means. Only a strategy of linkage is available.
However paradoxical, a more substantive agenda at the state-to-state
level would create more permissive conditions for greater Western
engagement with Russian society. A new American policy toward
Russia must pursue both — a more ambitious bilateral relationship
in conjunction with a more long-term strategy for strengthening
Russian civil, political, and economic societies, which ultimately
will be the critical forces that push Russia back onto a democratizing
path.
Russia’s Democratic Rollback
When bush and putin first met in Slovenia in June
2001, Bush was not alone in downplaying Putin’s antidemocratic
acts at home. At the time, many observers of Russian affairs inside
and outside of the Bush administration believed that Putin’s
positive achievements outweighed his negative steps. Putin was
presiding over Russia’s most substantial economic growth
since independence while also pursuing several economic reforms
— such as a new tax and land code — that had languished
for years under President Boris Yeltsin. In foreign affairs, Putin
was striking a pragmatic pose, cooperating with almost everyone
on something. At home, Putin’s battles with Chechens and
oligarchs (some of whom controlled major media holdings) were
justified as necessary steps toward righting the wrongs of the
chaotic Yeltsin years.
